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From the air, you can see the dead creek long before you see what killed it. For seven miles,
the water runs as green as lime Jell-O, and the trees on either side are dead. Follow the trail
upstream, and there's the suspect: a row of flat gray hog houses owned by J & H Milling.
Near the water's edge is the spot where twin pipes pumped the raw sewage of 12,000 hogs
directly into Middle Swamp [a Neuse River tributary]. The pumping went on for 14 years
until the creek suffocated in waist-deep sludge. 1
NoI orth Carolina has a hog farm problem. As the
hog farm industry grows in North Carolina, 2 so do
the environmental disasters that accompany it. This
paper will examine the environmental dangers that
the hog farm industry has posed to North Carolina's
rivers and streams and the failure of the state to
adequately prevent those harms from occurring. 3
Then, this paper will address general legal protections
against regulation by state and federal legislatures,
including a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's
regulatory takings analysis and the increasing
popularity of "takings bills" in state and federal
legislatures. 4 Specifically, this paper will review a
"takings bill" being considered by the North Carolina
General Assembly that would compensate a private
property owner for any diminution in value of her
land caused by a state regulation. 5 At the same time,
the Assembly was considering more stringent
regulation ofhog farms. Finally, this paper will argue
that a takings bill in North Carolina would not only
detrimentally affect the extent to which the state could
regulate hog farms that pollute the state's rivers and
streams, but would also be unfair to the landowners
who live downstream from those hog farmers and
who are denied beneficial use of their land because
of the state's failure to regulate. 6
Jennifer Davis is a third year law student at UNC-
Chapel Hillfrom Charlotte, N.C. She currently serves
as Managing Editor for the North Carolina Law
Review.
The Problem
Waste Spills, Intentional Dumping, and Fish Kills
Since 1989, the swine production industry has
quadrupled in North Carolina, making North Carolina
the nation's second largest hog producer after Iowa. 7
In June of 1995, an overfilled sewage lagoon and a
rain-soaked dike at Oceanview Farm Ltd., an Onslow
County hog farm, caused a dam to break, dumping
22 million gallons of pure hog waste into the New
River. 8 The North Carolina Department of
Environment, Health, and Natural Resources placed
blame for the spill squarely on the shoulders of the
farm operators. The operators had failed to plant
enough crops to take up the waste the farm generated,
had let the liquid level in the 25-million gallon waste
lagoon rise to the point of overflowing, and had
installed irrigation pipes in the side ofthe lagoon (the
eventual site of the breach that caused the spill)
without consulting any engineers. 9 After the spill, a
systematic survey of hog farm operations in North
Carolina ordered by Governor Jim Hunt found "60
farmers who were deliberately dumping animal waste
into streams through pipes or ditches . . . [and] fifty
other farms . . . discharging sewage inadvertently
through leaks or overflows from waste lagoons." 10
One commentator charged that the spills were "the
predictable results of an impotent regulatory and
enforcement process . . . [and] the contemptuous
indifference with which our state government has
treated its citizens and environment in the face of
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explosive hog-farm development." 11
These recent waste spills into North Carolina
rivers and swamps have caused fish to die by the
millions. 12 Rivers like the Neuse and Cape Fear have
become overloaded with nitrogen and phosphorus,
elements that cause a cycle of algae infestation and
oxygen depletion during which fish suffocate. 13
Each day, trainloads of nutrients arrive from the
Midwest in the form of feed grains for livestock.
The com and soybeans are fed to pigs and poultry,
and a little of the nitrogen and phosphorus is
absorbed into the animals bodies. The bulk of it
is excreted as animal waste. In the swine industry
alone, the 8 million hogs in the state's eastern
counties produce, conservatively, 10 billion
pounds of manure a year, which includes about
70 million pounds of nitrogen. 14
When this animal manure spills into rivers it joins
nitrogen already present in the rivers from ground
and ditch seepage of animal waste. Additionally,
ammonia gas adds nitrogen in rivers and streams as
it rises into the air from hog barns and lagoons and
returns to the earth in rainfall. 15 The nitrogen and
phosphorus cause inordinate amounts of algae to grow
on river surfaces. When the algae dies, it sinks to the
bottom of the river, where it is decomposed by
bacteria in a process that consumes oxygen. ''Unless
the water is mixed or recirculated somehow, the
oxygen eventually will run out," causing massive fish
kills. 16 One discouraged environmentalist recently
jested that he had "seen catfish crawling out of the
water" when commenting on millions of dead eels,
bream, bass and other fish that lined the Cape Fear
River last summer. 17
North Carolina 's Regulation ofHog Farms
interest on the local boards that administer the funds
and frequently award large sums of money to
themselves. 19
Prior to last summer's spills, swine industry
owners had blunted almost every effort in the North
Carolina General Assembly to better regulate hog
farms. 20 Even North Carolina's nuisance laws make
it extremely difficult for private property owners to
maintain a nuisance suit against hog farmers. 21 Early
last summer, however, it appeared that the tide was
turning. Governor Hunt issued strong statements to
state swine farmers that they should "shape up or ship
out."22 Not only was the Governor instrumental in
getting the North Carolina Division ofEnvironmental
Management to strengthen its plans for reducing
pollution in the Neuse river, but he was also the
impetus behind a Blue Ribbon Commission on
Agricultural Waste whose findings are due before
next month's regular session of the General
Assembly. 23 The group is considering the results of
several studies it commissioned and is reviewing
stricter regulation proposals for the swine industry,
including strict licensing procedures, mandatory
testing of lagoons and lagoon liners, emergency
spillways in all lagoons, and prohibitions on hog
farming in sensitive watersheds. 24 The commitment
Government Hunt and many North Carolina
legislators have shown to regulating hog farms in
order to promote the environmental welfare ofNorth
Carolina's rivers, streams, and drinking water is a
decided shift away from North Carolina's former
public policy. 25 However, if the regulations that arise
from the upcoming full session of the General
Assembly, sparked by the findings ofthe Blue Ribbon
Commission, are stringent enough, many hog farmers
will likely complain that the state government is
interfering with their property rights and their distinct
investment-backed expectations.
North Carolina has relied heavily over the past
several years on a voluntary approach to preventing
the flood of waste into North Carolina's rivers. The
North Carolina Agriculture Cost-Share Program was
begun in the mid-1980's to assist farmers in paying
for projects that prevent waste from entering North
Carolina's streams. "Growers may be reimbursed up
to $ 1 5,000 over three years for projects such as grass-
strip borders around fields or better animal-waste
disposal systems." 18 However, the state can document
no improvements in water quality from the $56
million it has spent on the program. Also, many critics
of the volunteer system complain about conflicts of
Likely Failure in the Future to Regulate Hog Farms
As one critic has noted "it would be difficult to
imagine a regulation of hog farms that could be so
stringent as to affect a takings of property," 26
compensable under the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. However, in the past decade
courts and legislatures have slowly been moving
towards greater protection of private property rights
in the face of a growing regulatory state. 27 This trend
could have an adverse effect on the extent to which
the North Carolina General Assembly chooses to
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regulate one of the state's biggest industries. 28
Already, the Blue Ribbon Commission has been
criticized for moving too slowly and many critics fear
the Commission's proposals will not be stringent
enough. 29 Activists question why no environ-
mentalists were chosen to serve on the Blue Ribbon
Commission which will propose new regulations for
the hog farm industry. In fact, five ofthe 1 8 members
on the Commission currently raise hogs, while eight
others have ties to the swine industry. 30 In response
to criticisms regarding the failure ofthe Commission
to include environmentalists, Co-Chairman of the
Commission U.S. Representative Tim Valentine said,
"What the heck—I think
of myself as an
environmentalist." 31
Legal Protection
Against Regulation
Many critics note the
existence of a changing
and reactionary judicial
and legislative com-
mitment to the protection
ofprivate property rights
in response to growing
governmental regulation
of environmental dan-
gers like those posed by
North Carolina's hog farm industry. As one
commentator noted, "[o]ver the last two decades the
growth of this country's environmental regulatory
regime has been nothing short of astonishing. It
accounts for many ofthe regulations covering almost
every aspect of our lives, which grow by 200 pages
each day in the Federal Register."32 Horror stories
by private property owners whose property has been
devalued or condemned by environmental regulations
abound in the rhetoric of the heated debate over the
contradictory interests of environmentalists and
property owners. 33 Representative Billy Tauzin of
Louisiana, in a vehement speech on the
"overzealousness" of regulatory officials, recently
stated: "Something is fundamentally wrong in our
country when a rat's home is more important than an
American's home. At the rate we're going, it won't
be long before we're forced to add people to the
Endangered Species List."34 Even federal judges have
entered the public debate. U.S. Claims Court Chief
Judge Loren Smith recently stated publicly that "the
takings clause was meant to provide a check on
government regulatory programs."35 Recent victories
for private property owners at the U.S. Supreme Court
in Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claims and
the growing popularity of legislative protections of
private property owners have combined to make for
"heady times for the champions of private property."36
Regulatory Takings Law and the Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
states: "nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation."37 Since 1922, this
clause has been interpreted to apply to certain
regulatory actions
of the government
that go "too far."38
In Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon, the
United States Sup-
reme Court recog-
nized that a gov-
ernment restriction
or regulation could
deny an owner of
distinct property
rights such that the
government would
be required to
compensate the
owner for "inverse
condemnation" or a "regulatory taking." Thus, the
Court has expressed that the Takings Clause serves
"to bar government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."39
Since this recognition, "the rivers of ink spilled and
forests of trees felled in the effort to understand the
field ofregulatory takings [has become] legendary."40
The Supreme Court has chosen an essentially ad
hoc procedure to determine ifa regulatory taking has
occurred. Historically, the Court has concerned itself
with three factors, which it delineated in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,i[ in reviewing
a regulatory takings claim: (1) the economic impact
of the regulation on the property owner, (2) the
regulation's effect on distinct investment-backed
expectations, and (3) the character of the
governmental action.42 If a government regulation
interferes too greatly with the economic value ofthe
property or with the expectations the owner had in
purchasing the property, or ifthe government's action
significantly interferes with an owner's rights to use
The Court has expressed that
the Takings Clause serves "to
bar government from forcing
some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole."
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his property, then the Court is more likely to find
that the government must compensate the owner. 43
The Court has also created two discrete categories
of regulatory takings claims that do not require an
analysis of the three factors delineated in Penn
Central. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corporation,** the Court held that "permanent
physical occupation is a government action of such a
unique character that it is a taking without regard to
other factors that a court might ordinarily examine."45
Thus, if a government action causes an object, in this
case a cable wire, to be permanently affixed to an
owners land, then compensation is required regardless
of whether a dim-
inution in value of
the property has
occurred and re-
gardless of the
degree to which the
property can rea-
sonably be con-
sidered to be "oc-
cupied."46 Similarly,
when a regulation
deprives an owner of
"all economically
beneficial or pro-
ductive use" of her
property, then the
Court has held that a
per se government
takings has oc-
curred. 47 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
the Court held that the government had taken two
beachfront parcels of land when it enacted a
conservation statute that prohibited building on the
beach.48 "It appears, however, that in instances of less
than total deprivation of value, the multi-factored
analysis described in Penn Central still guides the
courts."4 " These developments, coupled with U.S.
Supreme Court decisions like Dolan v. City of
Tigard5" and Nollan v. California, 51 have given
champions of private property rights several recent
victories to celebrate.
Federal and State "Takings Bills "
The election ofRepublican majorities in both the
Senate and the House of Representatives, "impelled
in part by public promises by party leaders to live up
to the terms of the "Contract with America,' has
dramaticallv increased the chances for congressional
If "any diminution in value" of
private property would trigger
mandated governmental
compensation, the existing
statutory set-back requirements
for hog farm lagoons and barns
could clear out the state treasury
in an afternoon.
passage of legislation protecting landowners from the
economic effects of a wide range of environmental
and land-use regulations." 52 Additionally, protective
legislation proposals have become increasingly
popular in state legislatures where agricultural
lobbyists have been more successful at convincing
state legislators of the federal "regulatory excess."53
Several states have passed bills requiring state
governments to assess the environmental impact of
their actions or to compensate land owners when a
regulation diminishes the value of private land by a
certain specified percentage of its value. 54 For
example, at the same time North Carolina lawmakers
are considering more
stringent regulation
of hog farming
operations, they are
also considering a
"Property Rights
Act" which, in the
words of the act, will
"provide for payment
of compensation to
an owner when land-
use regulation by a
governmental entity
causes an economic
impact resulting in
any diminution in the
total value of the
owner's land." 55
This proposed act,
which is still in committee, is modeled after several
similar state bills or proposed bills that have become
increasingly popular over the past few years. 56
Property Rights Bills usually come in one oftwo
forms. They are either "assessment bills" or
"compensation bills." 57 Assessment bills are those
bills which require "government to assess takings
implications (or property rights implications) of its
proposed actions in a formal process."58 In the past
three years, more than sixty assessment bills have
been introduced at the state level, often modeled after
President Reagan's Executive Order No. 12,630
requiring federal agencies to perform a takings
analysis before acting. 59 Six states have enacted such
provisions. 60 In support of these bills, many
proponents argue that assessment of takings
implications may lessen the extent to which state and
federal regulations encroach on private property rights
by requiring governmental agencies to "look before
they leap."61 However, critics of the acts argue that
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assessment is "just another layer ofred tape to thwart
agencies from regulating, no matter how great the
public need."62
Compensation bills, on the other hand, are those
bills that prescribe a "statutory standard for
compensating property owners once agency action is
taken" that causes a diminution in private properly
values. 63 Five compensation bills have been
successfully enacted at the state level. 64 out of the
fifteen proposed state compensation bills. 65 Similarly,
the 104th Congress is considering a compensation
bill at the federal level as part of the Contract With
America.66 These bills usually define a "takings" as
an act which causes private property to decrease in
value by a certain percentage, although some bills
have used more flexible standards. 67 Proponents of
these bills argue that constitutional remedies for
takings are inadequate because pursuing a claim
against the government requires too much time and
money and takings precedent is extremely unclear. 68
Thus, "a single, unvarying value-loss threshold as a
compensation trigger would afford greater certainty
to both landowner and government agency." 69
Detractors from this legislation argue that the "reality
is that the state simply cannot afford to pay offevery
landowner for every land-use decision," and that
compensation bills are arbitrary in that they disparage
the rights of property owners who just miss the
threshold percentage to trigger compensation. 70
Applications of a Takings Bills in North
Carolina
On a theoretical level, it is understandable that
takings bills would have some popular support,
especially when the debate is couched in terms of the
competing interests of animals and human property
owners. But a takings bill in North Carolina could
have several detrimental effects on the state's ability
to regulate its environment and on the rights of
properly owners who live near or downstream from
hog farmers. This section will demonstrate why
passage ofthe proposed Property Rights Act in North
Carolina is undesirable. Such a bill would tie the hands
of state legislators who wish to prevent hog farmers
from further damaging our state's ecosystem.
Additionally, the bill would prevent the state from
protecting landowners who are harmed by the acts of
hog farmers by not providing a remedy to property
owners when the state 'sfailure to regulate has caused
a diminution in value of their property and by using
valuation techniques that allow hog farmers to spread
the cost of their operations to downstream property
owners.
The Effect of Takings Bills on Needed Regulation of
the States ' Environment
In the earliest regulatory takings case before the
Supreme Court, Justice Holmes argued that
"[government hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every . . . change in the general
law." 71 In the case of takings bills, it is clear that
government could "hardly go on" regulating the
environment if it were obligated to compensate
owners for all diminutions in value of land caused by
a regulation. As one critic has argued, "[i]f the
government labored under so severe an obligation,
there would be, to say the least, much less
regulation."72 A compensation bill like the one being
proposed in North Carolina would leave state
government officials with one of two options:
bankruptcy or minimal regulation of the state's
environment. If "any diminution in value" of private
property would trigger mandated governmental
compensation, the existing statutory set-back
requirements for hog farm lagoons and barns73 could
clear out the state treasury in an afternoon. Caught
up in the rhetoric of "protecting property owners"
from "arrogant bureaucratic environmentalists,"
supporters of the Property Rights Act have failed to
consider the practical implications of limiting the
state's ability to protect its environment. The passage
of such an Act would leave the quality of our state's
rivers and streams in great peril.
No Remedy for Diminution in Value for Failure to
Regulate
Furthermore, supporters ofthe Act have forgotten
about the property rights of the owners who live
downstream from hog farm operators. As Professor
Joseph Sax recently noted:
It has never been the law that one owns property
without any obligation toward the public. ... It is
the obligation of every owner to try to find ways
to accommodate the needs, principles and goals
of the community in which he or she lives. It is
the property owner's obligation to try to adapt
uses so that economic benefits to the individual
owner flow from those uses, and at the same time
the benefits of the community rich in amenities
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as well as public health and safety can be
maintained. 74
North Carolina's proposed takings bill does not
allow property owners to demand compensation for
government' sfailure to regulate when that failure has
deprived them of any enjoyable use of their land. In
that respect, North Carolina's proposed Property
Rights Act protects the rights ofsome properly owners
(those whose property is being regulated) at the
expense of others (those whose property is harmed
by the state's failure to regulate).
Clearly, the Act forgets that property law does
more than "merely
protect men [sic] in their
possessions."75 Imagine
a society in which
owners of property were
not required to ac-
commodate the needs of
the community. It would
be a society with no
zoning laws, no nuisance
laws, no limitations on
water and air pollution,
and no protection of
endangered species. This
is the type of society that
takings bills envision,
and practically would
create, in the name of
protecting a person's
right to possess properly. This vision departs from
our most traditional understandings of the definition
of property. As one critic has explained, "property,
in the historical view, did not represent the
autonomous sphere of the individual to be asserted
against the collective; rather, it embodied and
reflected the inherent tension between the individual
and the collective."76 This tension cannot be resolved
through simplistic, bright-line legislation. The proper
resolution of the tension must come after a careful
weighing of the rights of individual owners and the
rights of the community to use and enjoy land.
Spreading the Costs to Those Already Harmed
The manner in which compensation would be
triggered by the proposed Act also fails to consider
"downstream property owners." The Act would
require the state to compensate a landowner (in this
case a hog farm operator) when "an appraisal . . .
indicates any diminution of the total value of the
property" (the hog farm). 77 A "market value"
appraisal of a parcel of land, however, would not take
into account the costs ofharms from unregulated use
of a particular parcel of land that would be spread to
other land owners. By failing to incorporate these
externalities into the "market value," the Act would
compensate hog farm operators for harming the
property values of other landowners. Hog farmers
would be free to pass the cost of operating an
agricultural operation in a manner that does not harm
other landowners to the very owners who are being
harmed under current practices.
A "market value" appraisal
of a parcel of land would
not take into account the
costs ofharms from
unregulated use of a
particular parcel of land
that would be spread to
other land owners.
Conclusions
Takings bills are
impractical and unfair.
The North Carolina
General Assembly, if it
were to pass such
legislation, would fail to
balance the inherent
tensions of the rights of
property owners and the
rights of the community
as a whole. The proper
bodies to perform this
balancing of interests are
the courts. While it is true
that the current judicial
procedure for resolving
regulatory takings claims is unpredictable:
[unpredictability may be desirable in a society
in which the governmental distribution of gain
and loss in property values requires controversial
policy choices. Courts may recognize that the
political process is the preferred method for
making these policy decisions. . . . [Current
judicial theories of takings law] allow a court to
invalidate land-use regulations it considers
unacceptable and to uphold these regulations
when it is willing to accept the political policy
decisions. These political necessities suggest that
a reformation of taking-clause theory to provide
more predictability may be unwise. 78
Reformation of takings law is especially unwise
when takings bills foster predictability by so
arbitrarily making controversial policy decisions that
only favor certain property owners at the expense of
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the rights of others. North Carolina's proposed
Property Rights Act is one more shameful way that
our state's public policy would openly favor
agricultural interests at the expense of the state's
environment.®
Editors' Note
This article was written in April, 1995. Late in
April, the Property Rights Act failed to pass the
General Assembly. However, it is likely that new
takings bills will be introduced in the 1997 Session.
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